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WHEN KLEPTOCRACY BECOMES INSOLVENT: 
BRUTE CAUSES OF THE CIVIL WAR IN SOUTH SUDAN 
 
ALEX DE WAAL
*
 
 
Abstract 
South Sudan obtained independence in July 2011 as a kleptocracy—a militarized, corrupt 
neo-patrimonial system of governance. By the time of independence, the South Sudanese 
‘political marketplace’ was so expensive that the country’s comparatively copious 
revenue was consumed by the military-political patronage system, with almost nothing 
left for public services, development or institution building. The efforts of national 
technocrats and foreign donors produced bubbles of institutional integrity but the system 
as a whole was entirely resistant to reform. The January 2012 shutdown of oil production 
bankrupted the system. Even an experienced and talented political business manager 
would have struggled, and President Salva Kiir did not display the required skills. No 
sooner had shots been fired than the compact holding the SPLA together fell apart and 
civil war ensued. Drawing upon long-term observation of elite politics in South Sudan, 
this article explains both the roots of kleptocratic government and its dire consequences. 
 
 
 
JUST FIVE WEEKS BEFORE the signing of the January 2005 Comprehensive Peace 
Agreement (CPA) that brought to an end the long civil war between the Government of 
Sudan and the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement/Army (SPLM/A), Commander 
Salva Kiir Mayardit summoned his Commander-in-Chief, John Garang de Mabior, to a 
meeting with an assembly of the SPLA commanders. Among the many criticisms voiced 
in the meeting, Cdr. Kiir, said: 
 
I would also like to say something about rampant corruption in the Movement. At 
the moment some members of the Movement have formed private companies, 
bought houses and have huge bank accounts in foreign countries. I wonder what 
kind of system are we going to establish in South Sudan considering ourselves 
indulged [sic] in this respect[?]
1
 
 
Eight months later, following Garang’s death, Kiir found himself President of the 
autonomous Government of South Sudan (GoSS) and First Vice President in the 
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Sudanese Government of National Unity (GoNU). Since then he has presided over a 
kleptocracy. Its roots lie in the way that Sudan ruled southern Sudan, including through a 
counter-insurgency that used ethnic militia, and in the nature of the insurgency itself, 
which was run on neo-patrimonial lines.
2
 But the stakes increased by several orders of 
magnitude in 2005-06, when oil monies suddenly made the SPLM/A rich. The World 
Bank observed that ‘[t]he former SPLM Secretariat of Finance, which managed resources 
of around $100,000, transformed itself into a Ministry responsible for managing over one 
and a half billion dollars annually.’3 Its budget doubled again by 2011.  
Garang was a unionist who had sought power and resources in Khartoum, and 
planned to use the state apparatus of the united Sudan for political transformation. Kiir’s 
political objective was the secession of South Sudan. He feared that President Omar al 
Bashir would renege on the CPA commitment to self-determination and accordingly he 
spent massively on the military payroll in order to make it too expensive for Sudanese 
security officers to rent southern militia. Meanwhile, Kiir’s strategy for managing the 
SPLM/A’s fractious leaders was to indulge their appetite for self-enrichment.  
Sudanese governance has long been neo-patrimonial, and a lesser-noticed feature 
of Sudanese rebellions, including the SPLM/A, has been that they share many of the 
same characteristics. In a neo-patrimonial system of governance, political office is used 
primarily for personal and factional advantage.
4
 The South Sudanese version has 
particular features. First, it is kleptocratic, both in the everyday sense that national leaders 
use every opportunity to steal public funds, and also in the original social-scientific sense 
used by Stanislav Andreski with reference to Nigeria: ‘The essence of kleptocracy is that 
the functioning of the organs of authority is determined by the mechanisms of supply and 
demand rather than the laws and regulations.’5 Second, it is militarized, in that 
contending members of the elite at all levels use force or the threat of force as an 
instrument of bargaining. Third, governance transactions are highly monetized, and the 
cashflow to the ruler is the heartbeat of governance. Fourth, it is a dynamic and 
‘turbulent’ system, in which patron-client relations are not stable but are constantly 
subject to renegotiation.
6
  
South Sudan’s political turbulence is akin to the chaotic structure of a stream of 
water from a tap: unpredictable from moment to moment, but retaining its basic structure 
over time. South Sudan became this way primarily because of how Sudan governed its 
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peripheries with a system of monetized and militarized tribalism. However, the SPLA’s 
armed struggle reproduced many of these characteristics, and after the CPA, they 
displayed them in an exaggerated form. Members of the South Sudanese political elite, in 
their desire to acquire wealth as fast as possible, and determination to prevent the 
northern government from renting the allegiance of southern militia and thereby 
jeopardizing the SPLM’s secessionist project, created a governing system even less 
regulated and no less brutal than its northern counterpart. Untrammeled greed, combined 
with the reckless decision to shut down national oil production, meant that by 2013 the 
South Sudanese government simply could not afford the loyalty payments to keep the 
system running, and it fell apart. 
In order to understand how this happened, it is critical to appreciate the key 
determinants of the functioning of a political marketplace: the flow of funds to the ruler, 
the extent of competition in the auction of loyalties, and the business skills of the ruler.
7
 
The ruler functionally classifies the national budget into three items: the ruler’s private 
security spending, the ‘political budget’ (for patronage), and the budget for public goods. 
The higher the demands on the security and political budgets, the less is left over for 
public services, development and institution-building. In an institutionalized system of 
governance, corruption and patronage are distortions of the system, albeit sometimes 
common ones. In a rentier political marketplace, corruption and patronage are the 
system. There may be bubbles of integrity, due to the efforts of committed and influential 
individuals to carve out a sphere of public spiritedness, but they are fragile and 
subordinate to the kleptocratic operation of the broader system.  
One of the most troubling characteristics of governance in much of north-east and 
central Africa is that contending elites use violence as a means of bargaining. A 
commander or a provincial leader can lay claim to a stake of state resources (rents) 
through a mutiny or rebellion. The government then attacks the leader and his 
constituency to press him to accept a lower price. After a number of people have been 
killed, raped and displaced, and their property looted or destroyed, as an exercise in 
ascertaining the relative bargaining strengths of the two parties, a deal will be reached. In 
South Sudan, these cycles have become known as “rent-seeking rebellions”. Such 
conflicts follow a material logic but have ethnic manifestations. 
Most accounts of South Sudanese separatism and the internal conflict within 
South Sudan focus on historic root causes and identity-based conflicts.
8
 While not 
discounting such societal factors, this article seeks instead to highlight the more 
immediate motivations for members of the political elite to use organized violence. That 
is, it deals with “brute causes” rather than root causes. The analysis is drawn from more 
than twenty years’ participant observation of South Sudanese elite politics, looking for 
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patterns in what sometimes appears to be patternless contestation and conflict. The 
analysis has implications for peacemaking and statebuilding, and the long-term prospects 
for South Sudan.   
 
 
War and civil war 
 
The roots of the war run deep. Since imperial conquests in the 19
th
 century, the 
peripheries of Sudan were ruled by means of administrative and militarized tribalism, and 
were grossly under-developed, and the people of the southern periphery in particular 
were regarded as at best second-class citizens, and at worst as commodities. Following 
violent pacification, which was concluded only in the 1920s, colonial governance was 
limited to ‘care and maintenance.’ After independence, successive governments in 
Khartoum ruled on behalf of commercial and military elites, creating a governing system 
characterized by extreme economic inequality and tribalized counter-insurgency.  
Although some southern Sudanese leaders early recognized the need for the 
transformation of the entire political economy of the country,
9
 most focused on their 
racist exclusion from the spoils of government, and sought to be members of the ruling 
clique on the same terms as their northern peers. Garang accused the southern rebel 
leaders during Sudan’s first civil war (1955-72) of being ‘jobbists,’ intent solely on 
gaining political posts for personal ends.
10
 The 1972 peace agreement brought the leaders 
of the Anyanya rebel movement back to southern Sudan, along with returnees from east 
Africa and ‘insiders’ who had worked with the Khartoum government. These groups 
fiercely competed for jobs in the new autonomous South Regional Government, in which 
‘a high political or administrative position was a very important foundation of wealth and 
also a basis of conversion of value into political support and clientelism.’11  
During the 1970s in northern Sudan, the established mercantile class of traders 
and farmers was overtaken by a middle class that was parasitic on the state and used 
government contracting as a route to enrichment.
12
 In southern Sudan there was no 
indigenous middle class apart from government office holders. In their study of national 
corruption during these years, the Sudanese economists El-Wathig Kameir and Ibrahim 
Kursany note: 
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Against this background the elite in the South wanted to enrich themselves 
as quickly as possible so as to be on a level with their colleagues in the 
North. This is why they have resorted to corruption as the quickest way of 
acquiring money.
13
 
 
The SPLM began in 1983, not only as a rebellion against northern 
misgovernment, but also as an assault on what Garang called the ‘bourgeoisified southern 
elite.’ It started with a spontaneous rush to arms, and the SPLA’s ranks swelled 
extraordinarily fast. As Garang noted, ‘We did not start as a Movement in the classical 
way of Latin American liberation movements with a small group of men. We started as a 
mob. We have been in a series of reforms, reforming a mob.’14 He tried to build a 
disciplined, centralized military-political movement, and to crush bourgeois tendencies. 
The SPLA’s militarism verged on nihilism, exemplified by the naming of the SPLA’s 
‘Locust Division’ and the notorious slogans chanted by graduating soldiers, ‘even my 
father, I will give him a bullet’15 and ‘You must live through the barrels of your guns. 
Food, wife and property wherever you find them are to be acquired through your 
might.’16 This attempt to smash the old order did not work: no ‘New Sudan’ emerged 
from the destruction. In fact, the SPLA split in 1991, unleashing several years of 
internecine bloodshed, which compelled Garang to accommodate his political supremacy 
to others’ demands for participation. The SPLM became more consultative, and more 
enmeshed in foreign programmes of humanitarian and political assistance.  
The SPLM deftly manipulated American and European sentiment, developing the 
narrative of a Christian people oppressed by an Arab-Muslim government, in order to win 
international backing including a free pass on human rights and corruption issues, at least 
for a while. Because Garang, alone among southern Sudanese leaders, retained credibility 
with the neighbouring countries and the international community, when peace 
negotiations finally began in earnest in 2001, the SPLM became the Government of 
Southern Sudan in waiting. 
Inverting its original intent, the SPLM became a magnet for rent-seekers. In 
reality, however, corruption had permeated the armed struggle from the earliest days. 
Peter Adwok Nyaba cites a shocking case of how food rations for conscripts in 
Ethiopia—which may in fact have been aid initially destined for refugees—was sold, 
contributing to the deaths by disease and starvation of many hundreds of young recruits.
17
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Over the years, SPLA officers became oriented towards an apparently unending supply of 
international humanitarian aid, which could be stolen with impunity.  
Looting food aid was elevated to military strategy in the 1990s, when the 
contending factions of the SPLA staged hunger camps to attract humanitarian relief, 
which was then stolen.
18
 Both NGOs and donors often connived in this: ‘Diversion [of 
food aid] was so blatant and widescale that one official speculated off the record that 
Garang himself must have been told by U.S. officials that indirect support of him (at that 
time) would come in the form of plentiful food assistance, which is easily diverted and 
bartered.’19 Another case was the exploitation of church donors to pay funds to ransom 
supposed former slaves, a practice that quickly acquired the reputation of being a 
racket.
20
 SPLA officers also sold natural resources including gold and timber to finance 
the war effort and themselves, leading some to speak of ‘blood teak.’21 During the war 
years, SPLA commanders became a ‘military aristocracy’ using a raft of coercive, corrupt 
and patrimonial measures.
22
 
Meanwhile, the Government of Sudan played an effective game of divide-and-
rule, exploiting the greed and grievance of southern elites to turn the civil war into an 
internecine conflict between southern Sudanese armed groups, with militia commanders 
selling their services to the highest bidder. The SPLA was compelled to compete with the 
National Congress Party (NCP) in this game. 
 
 
Rent-seeking secessionism 
 
The CPA was heralded as Sudan’s “second independence” and its last and best chance for 
unity. It promised to resolve half a century of conflict over national identity and structure 
of government. However, the CPA contained unresolved questions. Was it a mechanism 
for national democracy or a stepping stone for the secession of the South? And was it a 
means of broadening political participation, or sharing power and wealth between the two 
signatory parties?
23
 It is possible that had Garang lived he and Vice President Ali Osman 
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Taha would have made the collective Presidency into a dynamic institution that could 
have transformed Sudan.
24
 After Garang’s death, that future was closed. 
 Instead, under President Omar al Bashir and First Vice President Salva Kiir, the 
implementation of the CPA became an exercise in zero sum competitive patronage. In 
principle, the two leaderships could have cut a deal that would have resulted in the 
southern elite buying in to a united Sudan. The NCP could have lavished enough largesse 
on their southern compatriots to mollify the animosities engendered by decades of Arab-
Islamic political identity projects. In practice, leaders in Khartoum did not make a serious 
offer.   
 The wealth-sharing provisions of the CPA provided half of the income from 
southern Sudanese oil directly to the GoSS and the remainder to the GoNU. It its short-
term bid to maximize its own political budget, the NCP leadership did not spend any 
significant amount of the latter on southern Sudan. For the GoSS, secession therefore 
implied a straightforward doubling of oil revenue. Although the current oilfields passed 
their peak production in 2008-10 with production expected to decline by half by 2020,
25
 
the GoSS also looked to the short-term funding stream, not to any longer-term benefits 
from remaining in a united Sudan. Figure 1 shows oil production from 2005 to 2012 and 
the government’s own projections for future production from existing fields. 
 
FIGURE 1 IN HERE 
 
Sudan enjoyed an economic boom in the 2000s. The national budget expanded 
from $950 million in 1999 to over $11 billion in 2006. However, this petroleum-and-
peace dividend was dispensed mostly on expanding the public sector and security 
services payroll.
26
 This was the NCP’s means of consolidating its fractious constituency, 
and it paid off in its landslide victory in the 2010 general election. Those ‘ugly elections’ 
resembled the conservative, even authoritarian tendencies of electoral politics in some 
Middle Eastern countries, which have been characterized as ‘competitive clientelism,’ in 
which candidates compete by promising their potential for being most in favour with the 
president.
27
 The elections in southern Sudan were no more honest, with the electoral 
victories of SPLM candidates in every single gubernatorial race particularly incredible. 
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For the SPLM leadership and its international backers, self-determination was 
more important than democracy. The national elections were downgraded to a box to tick 
on the path to the referendum, and were held just nine months before that referendum, so 
there was no opportunity for an elected government to demonstrate the benefits of 
national unity. The elections led not to a broadening of the two governments, but parallel 
clean sweeps by the two ruling parties, which between them won every governorship and 
422 of the 446 seats in the National Assembly. 
While the CPA formally committed the SPLM to working for unity, and left the 
outcome of the referendum to popular choice, the SPLM leadership was not prepared to 
compromise on its unstated commitment to secession. It therefore needed to build a 
strong army to deter northern Sudan. This was one reason why the SPLA expanded when 
the war was over, as Khartoum’s defence spending increased.28 Figure 2 is based on the 
SPLA’s own estimates for its payroll, and that of the southern Sudanese enrolled in the 
Sudanese army and militia. 
The CPA security arrangements were designed to enable SPLA to deter the 
Government of Sudan from reneging on the agreement, by becoming became the GoSS 
army. But in 2005, the SPLA was a minority armed force in southern Sudan, and it faced 
many armed southern rivals, which were collectively more numerous and better armed.
29
 
On assuming office, Kiir chose to absorb these other groups rather than fight them. He 
made a simple bargain with the senior commander of the Khartoum-sponsored South 
Sudan Defence Force, General Paulino Matiep. As is the nature of agreements based on 
trust and common understanding, the Juba Agreement of January 2006 is short and 
simple—and carries the implicit promise of honour among thieves.  
 
FIGURE 2 HERE 
 
Kiir was afraid, not only that militia leaders could disrupt southern Sudan, but 
also that Khartoum’s security paymasters would use cash to buy the support of 
discontented southern Sudanese provincial elites, who could make the referendum 
impossible or swing the results towards unity. For that reason, shortly after the Juba 
Agreement, the Southern Sudan Legislative Assembly voted to double the pay of private 
soldiers, to $150/month, twice that of their counterparts in the Sudan Armed Forces. As 
the referendum approached, this was again raised to $220.  
The Kiir-Matiep bargain most likely averted a civil war, but consolidated southern 
Sudan’s neo-patrimonial tendencies. Rather than demobilizing, the SPLA expanded after 
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the end of the war. From a generous estimate of 40,000 fighters in 2004, the SPLA 
expanded to absorb numerous militiamen, former soldiers in the Sudanese army, new 
recruits and actual and potential rebels, so that the army itself had a payroll of about 
240,000 in 2011, with another 90,000 policemen, prison warders and wildlife guards 
serving as a paramilitary reserve.
30
 The SPLA’s own internal audit suggested a minimum 
of 40,000 “ghost soldiers” whose salaries were pocketed by their commanders.31 During 
the 2005-11 Interim Period, more than 80 percent of defence spending was on wages and 
allowances, which were usually hugely overspent (see Table 1).
32
 
 
Table 1: South Sudan defence spending (US$m) 
 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 
Defence 586 580 917 688 736 1,047 964 
Total Govt exp.   2,281 1,888 2,563 3,273 2,785 
Defence (% of exp.)   40 36.5 28.7 32.0 34.6 
GDP    15,264 11,853 15,179 19,146 10,220 
Defence (% of GDP)   6.0 5.8 4.8 5.5 9.4 
 
Sources: Defence spending: 2006-08: Lewis 2009, p. 66; 2009: World Bank 2010-12: SIPRI; (excludes 
other uniformed services and off-budget expenditure); GDP and government spending: World Bank data. 
 
Additionally, public order spending (on the police, prisons and security service) reached 
over $600 million in 2011. Off-budget spending on major arms purchases such as 110 T-
72 tanks from Ukraine consumed many more hundreds of millions of dollars.
33
 As the 
referendum neared, the perils of the Sudanese political marketplace were noted:
34
 
 
Today, Sudan’s main domestic mechanism for conflict management is financial 
patronage. This functions in the shadow of unregulated political competition 
between the NCP and SPLM, and between the NCP and what it sees as an 
international conspiracy in favor of regime change. This is leading to a defensive 
zero-sum political game in which the NCP and SPLM spend excessively on rival 
patronage systems. Apart from war, there is another adverse outcome to arms 
races, which is that the economic burden cripples one party to the point of 
collapse. It is possible that today’s arms-and-patronage race will end up with the 
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Sudanese parties bankrupting themselves and making Sudan effectively 
ungovernable. 
 
South Sudan’s defence budget is distinct from the personal security budget of the 
President. Kiir’s security budget paid for the newly-created ‘Presidential Guard’35—the 
Tiger Battalion he led in the early days of the war, supplemented by hand-picked loyalists 
and supplied and trained by U.S. private military contractors—plus a militia from his 
home region.
36
 Most SPLA spending was ‘political budget’—loyalty payments.  
Despite clear problems, there was no internal SPLA reform other than expansion 
of numbers. Edward Lino, a senior SPLM member, complained: 
 
SPLA has never been a robust united force since we started to incorporate militia 
into it in appalling numbers. Each formation taken was not fully absorbed, in 
reality. But was left to wonder [sic] in uniform commanded by their previous 
untrained jihadist officers. Each soldier was almost free to take whoever to choose 
to be commander! … In reality, there was nothing called ‘SPLA’! It was divided 
and shredded into tribal formations adhering to individual commanders, based on 
localized tribal understanding.
37
 
 
Lino’s allegation that southern militia were under jihad-ist officers is an 
exaggeration, but his key point holds: the SPLA was less a guardian of national security 
than a social welfare distribution combined with a threat to the security of the 
communities where its forces were stationed. It became a vast, one-dimensional infantry 
force, deployed in the home areas of militarized communities. In other places—such as 
the borderlands of Western Equatoria affected by the depredations of the Lord’s 
Resistance Army—the SPLA was largely absent, and the government responded to the 
problem by providing $2m to train and arm additional village militia, known as “Arrow 
Bows.”38 
The enormous payouts to expand the SPLA payroll were critical in deterring the 
northern leadership from trying to stop the southern Sudanese referendum. The former 
national security chief Salah Abdalla ‘Gosh’ complained that southern militia had 
become so overpriced that Khartoum was squeezed out of the market.
39
 Kiir’s strategy 
worked, and, the fact that the official vote tally in the referendum was 98.83 percent in 
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favour of secession stands as a testament to the hegemonic power of the SPLM-SPLA 
patronage-coercion nexus.  
 
 
Rent-seeking governance 
 
Kiir’s strategy of rewarding loyalty with license for fraud also meant that South Sudan 
achieved independence as a kleptocracy. The nation entered the Transparency 
International corruption perception index almost at the bottom: ‘Corruption permeates all 
sectors of the economy and all levels of the state apparatus and manifests itself through 
various forms, including grand corruption and clientelistic networks along tribal lines.’40 
Corrupt practices and rapid self-enrichment among the SPLM leadership were observable 
from 2005. A scandal over procurement of grain and building associated infrastructure 
became public in 2011, with allegations that hundreds of millions of dollars in state funds 
had gone missing.
41
 The following year, Kiir has acknowledged that at least $4bn and 
possibly much more has been diverted by leading figures in government and taken 
abroad. Kiir publicly accused 75 government leaders of corruption but his stated intent to 
add fifty army leaders to the list was not followed through after representations from 
SPLA generals.  
 Until 2012, the supply of funds was enough to meet the demands of the greater 
part of the South Sudanese elite. South Sudan’s public spending was $350 per capita, 
three times that of Kenya and seven times Ethiopia’s, in addition to aid receipts of over 
$100 per capita, more than any of its neighbours.
42
 By far the biggest source of rent was 
oil revenue, but aid and investment were important secondary sources. As the South 
Sudan Investment Conference website coyly notes, ‘where risks are high so are the 
returns. All the societal and infrastructural challenges in South Sudan are Investment 
Opportunities in disguise.’43  
 Land is South Sudan’s second biggest resource, and less and less of it is under the 
control of communities. Between 2007-10 alone, more than 5 percent of the land area 
was leased to foreign investors, ostensibly for the development of agriculture, biofuels, 
forestry or wildlife parks.
44
 The deals were marked by opacity, lack of consultation with 
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the affected communities, disregard for both customary law and the Land Act, failure of 
investors to deliver on promises of social services and compensation to relocated 
communities, and local tension.
45
 Government officials have admitted that most land 
deals were ‘unofficially signed,’46 and the extremely low leasehold rates—for example 
just $125,000 annually to lease 105,000 hectares of land in Unity State
47—are warning 
signs that suggest that most money paid by investors never made it into the official 
accounts.  
 The pattern of public spending wholly ignored budgetary discipline, with tiny 
amounts going to public services such as health and education and investment and actual 
allocations of funds being made on a cash-in-hand basis to whoever had the most 
persuasive political demand.
 
Figure 3 shows how spending tracked actual revenue, not 
budgets. Greg Larson and colleagues describe this: 
 
One donor official distinguished between the “Real Ministry of Finance” and the 
“Fake Ministry of Finance”. The “Fake Ministry” is the one working with the 
donors and technical advisors on budget allocations, promoting the outward 
appearance of high functionality, while the “Real Ministry” is operated through 
backdoor dealings between South Sudanese officials, concealed from donor view. 
As the donor official says: “The technical advisors help prepare budget 
allocations, but then the army generals wheel into the minister’s office, and they 
make the real allocations.” While budget allocations are readily and publically 
available from MoFEP, the budget expenditures are only rarely (and then, only 
partially) shared.
48
 
 
FIGURE 3 IN HERE 
 
Despite repeated efforts by international partners, the quality of budgetary 
management actually declined over the period 2007-12. A brief improvement in 
discipline following a fiscal crisis in 2009, when the price of oil dropped sharply, was 
soon reversed when revenue rebounded.
49
 Despite South Sudan having by far the largest 
public expenditure per capita in East Africa, and a very generous allocation of aid, there 
was very modest progress in health and education indicators. The World Bank’s 2013 
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public expenditure review lamented that ‘the current pattern of public expenditures, if left 
unchanged, will not allow meaningful gains in social outcomes in health and education 
over the foreseeable future.’50 
Much of the national wealth was simply stolen or recycled into a patronage 
system. Meanwhile, donors and international financial institutions worked under the 
misapprehension that corruption was an abuse of the system, and that the SPLM 
leadership genuinely intended to build working institutions. In fact, corruption is the 
system. Kiir’s main instrument of governance was permitting members of the elite to join 
the kleptocratic club. He was at the top of the system but not in control of it, and, as he 
later noted, ‘once there is corruption, there is insecurity.’51 
 
 
The doomsday machine 
 
By 2011, the costs of maintaining this system were so inflated that the ‘political budget’ 
was crowding out all other spending. Not only did this governance method eliminate the 
budgetary discipline, but it made political management almost impossible. In the 
provinces, the security-corruption nexus translated into ethnic-military patronage. 
Military commanders were both rewarding and defrauding their followers, by putting 
them on the payroll but cheating them of their full pay. For both patronage purposes and 
to lessen the dangers of the mobilization of the aggrieved, commanders assembled 
military units on tribal lines with the aim of maximizing personal loyalty. This is one 
reason why three attempts to institute a centralized roster of SPLA soldiers were 
thwarted. It is an inherently risk way of managing an army: it generates grievance at 
every level and, because most units are composed on ethnic lines, any military operation 
risks becoming an ethnic conflict. 
Since 2006, and most noticeably since the 2010 elections, a growing phenomenon 
in southern Sudan has been ‘rent-seeking rebellion,’ namely the mutiny of army 
commanders or local political leaders with armed constituents, seeking a larger share of 
the resources dispensed by government.
52
 Among the abler practitioners of this are Gen. 
Peter Gatdet, who has defected several times, and David Yau Yau, who has staged two 
rebellions in Jonglei. These rebellions follow a characteristic cycle of mutiny, counter-
attack (both of which entail high levels of fatalities among soldiers and civilians), 
bargaining between the rebel leader and government, and a settlement in which the rebel 
leader obtains a government or army post and his followers are enrolled in the SPLA. 
Variants include the payroll mutiny, such as occurred among parts of the Third and Fifth 
                                                 
50
 World Bank, ‘Public expenditures in South Sudan’, p. 16. 
51
 Salva Kiir, remarks at the Tana High Level Forum on Security in Africa, Bahir Dar, Ethiopia, 27 April 
2014. 
52
 Small Arms Survey, ‘Pendulum swings: the rise and fall of insurgent militias in South Sudan’ (Small 
Arms Survey, Human Security Baseline Assessment, Issue Brief No. 22, Geneva, 2013). 
  
 
 
Divisions in March 2010. The logic of the mutineers is to organize enough force to 
compel the government to bargain, and the logic of the government is to use enough 
punitive force to compel the rebels to settle for a lower price. As remarked by a local 
chief, ‘we understand this government, it listens better to people doing bad things.’53 On 
the surface these appear to be ethnic conflicts, but that is a product of the ethnic 
patronage that constitutes military units, not deep-rooted tribal animosities.
54
 However, 
these conflicts typically generate bitterness, enmity and a cycle of revenge. Human lives 
are casually expended to signal seriousness in bargaining. 
Political indiscipline is also seen in the way that State governors and SPLA 
divisional commanders ran autonomous policies, to the extent of being able to determine 
national security decisions independently of Juba. Examples of this occurred in the 2012 
border conflict with Sudan. The exact process of decision-making whereby SPLA units 
crossed the border and occupied Heglig in April is not clear. One version of events is that 
the divisional commander gave the order without higher authorization, forcing the 
President’s hand. Alternatively, Kiir went back on an assurance given days earlier to the 
U.S., and ordered the attack. Whatever the truth about this incident, the President’s 
limited authority became evident six months later, when Kiir, having signed Cooperation 
Agreements with Sudan, had to renegotiate those agreements because of pressure from 
constituencies in Northern Bahr al Ghazal that insisted that their interests in the border 
area were not properly reflected in the text. 
The most spectacular example of chaotic political decision-making is the shut 
down of national oil production in January 2012. South Sudan achieved independence 
without an agreement with Sudan on the terms under which oil should be transported, 
through the sole pipeline, to Port Sudan in northern Sudan for export. For some months, 
South Sudan exported oil without paying anything to Sudan. Perceiving that South Sudan 
was ready for this state of affairs to continue indefinitely, in December 2011 Khartoum 
began diverting South Sudanese oil to its refineries and to ships that it had itself 
chartered, waiting in Port Sudan. This was illegal. The international community, with the 
African Union High-Level Implementation Panel (AUHIP) in charge of the mediation, 
responded with pressure on Khartoum to stop the diversion of oil, and proposals to 
resolve the crisis.
55
 Nonetheless, on 20 January 2012, the Minister of Petroleum 
instructed oil companies to prepare for a national shutdown. 
Negotiations on the terms of a deal on oil and related financial issues had been 
ongoing since 2010, and key points of principle had been agreed. The AUHIP therefore 
had a good indication of what would be acceptable to the parties, and put forward a 
proposal accordingly on 21 January. The next day, the South’s chief negotiator, SPLM 
Secretary General Pagan Amum Okiech, dismissed the AUHIP proposal as ‘biased’. 
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Ethiopian Prime Minister Meles Zenawi foresaw the consequences of a shutdown as 
‘suicidal’ and anticipated that the South Sudanese would come to their senses.56 He and 
the AUHIP called a special summit of the north-east African regional bloc, the 
InterGovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD), for 27 January, to negotiate a 
solution.  
Kiir arrived for the special summit, to be held at the Sheraton Hotel in Addis 
Ababa. He booked himself into a luxury villa at the hotel, which normally costs $30,000 
per night.
57
 At 11.30 a.m. on 27 January, Prime Minister Meles, Kenyan President Mwai 
Kibaki, the chair of the AUHIP President Thabo Mbeki and a second member of the 
Panel, President Pierre Buyoya, met with Presidents Kiir and al Bashir. Despite the best 
efforts of members of the mediation team to track him down, Pagan disappeared and was 
not present for this meeting. After a break for a late lunch, the full session of the IGAD 
Summit opened just after 17:00. In the chair, Meles opened the meeting with formalities, 
and then announced the good news that a resolution to the oil crisis was imminent: ‘both 
are ready to sign despite serious reservations, on the understanding that nothing is finally 
agreed until all is agreed.’ There was applause and Meles asked presidents Kiir and 
Bashir to address the summit. Kiir had been sitting impassively, with his aides 
whispering urgently in his ear. He responded first: ‘with regret I must inform you that our 
delegation is still discussing the matter and might not be ready to sign.’ Silence fell on 
the hall. 
At 20.45, Pagan held a press conference in the hotel. He said, ‘We have been 
forced to shut down oil exploitation until we get this [complete] commitment from the 
GoS [Government of Sudan]. The shut down will be complete, and we will discuss with 
Kenya, Ethiopia and Djibouti for future oil operations options. It's a tough decision we 
had to make. … These talks have come to an end.’58 Pagan publicly denied a split in the 
SPLM, but he had overruled and humiliated his president. His logic defies easy 
explanation. Why would he contradict the basic tenet of a monetized patronage system by 
eliminating its cashflow? The rationale of the shut-down, as explained by Pagan over 
breakfast six days earlier, was that South Sudan had sufficient cash reserves to last eight 
months, and before that period was out the Government of Sudan would fall, because it 
depended on revenues and tariffs from oil and it was facing armed insurgencies and 
popular unrest.
59
 Pagan was the champion of a group within the SPLM/A leadership that 
still adhered to Garang’s doctrine of seizing control of the power and wealth of 
Khartoum. Without this, they believed, South Sudan could never control its own destiny. 
With those resources, their political system would be hugely better funded. After meeting 
Pagan and his team, Meles described them as ‘better informed than I expected, and more 
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reckless than I expected.’ Fearing that this action would cause the collapse of both 
countries, this could be described as South Sudan’s ‘economic doomsday machine.’60 
The political calculus of the SPLM leaders was based on elite factors: their own 
resources and interests. Thus they felt able to act in a manner without any reference to the 
welfare of the citizens of their country.  The decision to close down the entire national 
production caught donors and oil companies entirely by surprise. A World Bank team, 
visiting Juba one month later, met with the Government and then briefed international 
donors: 
 
The World Bank has never seen a situation as dramatic as the one faced by South 
Sudan. In [Mr. Guigale’s] view, neither the President nor senior ministers present 
in the meeting were aware of the economic implications of the shut-down. He 
candidly said that the decision was shocking and that the officials present [at the 
previous meeting] had not internalized nor understood the consequences of the 
decision.
61
 
 
The government attempted to manage the resulting revenue collapse by 
implementing several measures. It doubled domestic revenue collection but this made no 
discernible dent in the finance gap. An emergency budget was passed that purported to 
cut public spending in half.
62
 The cuts fell on the politically lightweight areas and not at 
all on the military—which ignored the constraints, spent almost $1bn (see table 1) and 
made a mockery of the austerity budget. Reserves of $2bn were spent. The Government 
borrowed an amount estimated at $4.5bn
63
 at commercial rates against future oil 
production, but the then-Minister of Finance, Kosti Manibe Ngai, asserted that he had no 
knowledge of how most of the loans were negotiated and where the funds were held.
64
 
Six months after the shut-down, Pagan was obliged to agree a deal on oil with northern 
Sudan on very similar (and slightly less favourable) terms to those he had rejected in 
January. A full set of cooperation agreements was signed in September but the oil only 
resumed production in April 2013. 
 
 
Managing a bankrupt kleptocracy 
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After independence, the main factors causing inflation in the price of loyalty were no 
longer competition from Khartoum, they were the dynamics of the South Sudanese 
political marketplace itself. In March 2013, three members of the SPLM Political 
Committee—Vice President Riek Machar, Pagan Amum, and Rebecca Nyandeng, widow 
of John Garang—declared their intent to contest the presidency in the 2015 general 
election. One interpretation of this was that each of the three aimed to reorder the 
hierarchy of kleptocracy in their favour. Another is that, having gained enough personal 
benefit, the challengers planned to develop a national political agenda beyond the naked 
greed of the political marketplace (in the way that some successful businessmen become 
politicians or philanthropists). Either way, the financial payoff required to keep the 
challengers in line was more than Kiir could afford, and the political reforms needed to 
head off their challenge were beyond his talents. The amount of money in Kiir’s political 
budget was diminishing, and in the meantime he was accumulating a new group of 
cronies who were not ready to be dislodged, several of whom had close ties to the 
leadership in Khartoum. While he was at the apex of the system, Kiir was not in control 
of it. Notably, he did not have a dominant, let alone monopolistic, position on control of 
information about the political system.  
 To manage this challenge, Kiir turned to using his executive power, with an 
implicit threat of coercion. In July he dismissed Machar and the majority of his cabinet 
and brought in others whose demands were more modest. The dissenters refused his 
invitation to form a different political party and contest elections, well aware that SPLM 
membership was the only guaranteed ticket to being a member of the ruling club. A 
second reason for staying in the SPLM was that they hoped to manage internal elite 
political competition in a non-violent way. However, each side knew that it would need 
to threaten the use of force, at the minimum, to maintain its leverage. 
 Kiir’s measures had appreciable short-term results. Relations with Sudan 
improved and oil production and export re-started in April 2013. Government offices 
began to function with noticeably greater attention to timekeeping. But the president’s 
political management was inept. By dismissing his challengers at one time he pushed 
them together into a single bloc that putatively commanded a majority in the SPLM 
Political Committee. He then declared his intention to suspend all SPLM organs other 
than the Chairman’s office (his own position), but partially reversed this by agreeing to a 
meeting of the National Liberation Council, the SPLM’s legislative body (in which he 
would win a majority). 
 For nine months, Kiir and his adversaries in the SPLM leadership danced around 
one another like boxers reluctant to land the first blow.
65
 To change the metaphor, it was 
as if they knew that the slightest spark that jumped the thin layer of insulation between 
party and army—that most slender of constitutional fictions—would ignite a trail of 
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gunpowder that led straight to the army units at the presidential palace and SPLA 
headquarters, and from there to critically placed charges along the ethnic fracture lines of 
the SPLA itself. On 15 December, the friction of the political contest generated just such 
a spark, and within two days the whole edifice of government, party and army was blown 
apart. The 2006 Juba Agreement, the basis of internal stability in South Sudan, was dead. 
 The prospects of a cheaper and manageable political marketplace vanished in a 
puff of smoke. Who started the shooting and with what purpose is less relevant than the 
fact that each had prepared for this eventuality. As noted by one of the founders of the 
Sudd Institute in Juba, ‘Based on the interviews we conducted few days before the 
violence, both sides had resigned in their efforts to find a peaceful means and they both 
had resorted to zero sum calculations.’66 The leaders resorted immediately to a mixture of 
cash payoff and appeals to solidarity. Kiir, having greater funds, was better placed to use 
financial patronage and therefore to make appeals to national sentiment and ethnic unity. 
He announced a plan to recruit another 5,000 soldiers from each state (a number soon 
exceeded),
67
 asked the Ugandan army to defend Juba, and then to fight the rebels in Bor, 
and allocated extra funds to the SPLA.
68
 He paid every member of the assembly to 
propagate his version of the events to their constituents.  
 The SPLM/A in opposition, led by Machar, had less money and therefore 
appealed more directly to ethnic sentiment, mobilizing the “White Army” of Nuer youth. 
The White Army helped itself to booty in Bor town and elsewhere. Subsequently Machar 
struck in Malakal, Bentiu and Renk with the aim, inter alia, of controlling the oil fields 
and reducing the financial capacity of the government. While the initial battles resembled 
two large coalitions of forces engaged in intense, geographically limited fighting, as the 
conflict continues it is likely to mutate. The logistics, organization and finance of 
maintaining the contending coalitions stretched the capacities of each leader, and the 
appeal to passion began to fade, causing subordinates on either side to inflame ethnic 
sentiments and especially a spirit of revenge. Each began to develop a personally loyal 
security force, mercenaries, and to adopy version of Khartoum’s old militia strategy of 
renting loyalties. Indicative of this is the fact that, despite having several hundred 
thousand troops and paramilitaries ostensibly available to fight, Kiir relied on a few 
battalions of Ugandan soldiers for key combat operations. By April 2014, South Sudan 
appeared to be on the brink of a new cycle of rent-seeking rebellions, and mutinies and 
reconfigurations within each side, leading to a more widespread multi-sided conflict. 
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Implications 
 
The anthropologist Cherry Leonardi describes how ‘liberation’ became individual self-
enrichment in South Sudan:
69
 
 
A growing resentment is reported among junior soldiers as well as civilian youth 
regarding the monopolization of the profits of war (and peace) by senior officers. 
The word “liberation” is increasingly used with bitter irony in reference to senior 
officers “liberating” land, resources and even women from their rightful owners. 
“It is the commanders who liberated themselves—from poverty!” as one young 
NGO employee from Yei put it. 
 
For many members of the southern elite, ‘liberation’ was possession of the same 
opportunities to loot a state, as their northern peers had long enjoyed. For Garang, the 
workable definition of ‘New Sudan’ was a nation ruled by John Garang. Ordinary 
fighters in the SPLA were famously and confidently coy: ‘What we are fighting for, we 
know.’70 What they got, however, was a cruder version of the militarized political 
marketplace against which they thought they had been fighting. To challenge Khartoum’s 
neo-patrimonialism, the SPLM/A leadership set up a more ruthless version of that 
kleptocracy. 
International partners erroneously assumed that either a nascent institutional, rule-
governed system existed, or that South Sudanese leaders were genuinely seeking to 
establish such a system, and that corruption and rent-seeking were deviations from this 
system. This is no longer possible to believe. Good faith efforts to build institutional 
integrity were routinely suborned toward factional advantage and private gain. Security 
sector reform and disarmament, demobilization and reintegration failed utterly.  
Members of the South Sudanese elite, within the Government and opposition—
and including the larger number who identify with their own interests—are attempting to 
suborn the peace negotiations established by IGAD immediately after the conflict 
exploded, and turn it into an arena for tactical bargaining. For them, the negotiating 
forum is entirely subordinate to both cash-based patronage bargaining and the logic of 
force, as well as providing an opportunity for rest and recreation. The principal function 
of the mediation exercise is that it will be on hand when the South Sudanese leaders 
decide to make a deal, and can legitimize the new bargain among the kleptocrats. This 
point was poignantly expressed by Jok Madut Jok, head of the Sudd Institute: ‘The two 
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men [Kiir and Machar] will eventually sit down, resolve their issues, laugh for the 
cameras, and the thousands of civilians who have died will not be accounted for.’71 
 The African mediators and South Sudanese civil society organizations recognize 
this likelihood, and are proposing mechanisms such as national dialogue, a truth and 
reconciliation commission, or people-to-people peace as supplements to an elite political 
bargain. Any effort to make South Sudanese politics more participatory and transparent 
will press the leadership to be more accountable, but South Sudan’s leaders are also 
experienced at co-opting these kinds of exercise into their own political business 
management. Under extreme pressure during the 1990s, the SPLA was compelled to 
establish political institutions and civilian structures,
72
 and to concede to local peace and 
reconciliation initiatives led by lower-ranking commanders and church leaders.
73
 Garang 
made every effort to circumvent the demands made by these participatory processes, to 
coopt their instigators, and to turn them into instruments for consolidating the SPLM/A 
and his position as its leader. He succeeded, but the SPLM/A that emerged had stronger 
mechanisms for collective political management and greater openness to civilians than 
beforehand.  
After the CPA, there have been numerous local conflict resolution initiatives 
building on the model of inter-tribal reconciliation conferences, which, as noted by 
Schomerus and Allen, provide resources and legitimacy to tribal leaders, and redefine 
conflicts arising from administrative and military politics as inter-communal disputes.
74
 
This does not make these exercises futile, but rather draws attention to the way in which 
they function as fora for contesting power and meaning. For example, political leaders 
may cynically tribalize a political dispute, in an effort to mobilize a constituency cheaply 
and distract attention from political causes, but in doing so they also invoke the authority 
of tribal chiefs whose power is legitimated by custom, and may in turn find themselves 
beholden to those chiefs. 
 Perhaps the most powerful and subversive demand is for justice. The logic of the 
unregulated political marketplace reduces social relations and even people themselves to 
commodities. People naturally resist this fundamental violation, and the language of 
human rights and accountability for crimes is a powerful way of asserting basic human 
dignity and a demand for government in the public interest. Anecdotal evidence suggests 
that South Sudanese want equally to address economic crimes and atrocities. They, of 
course, well understand the inter-related nature of these violations. 
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 Almost thirty years ago, President Nimeiri’s insolvent kleptocracy was brought 
down by non-violent street demonstrations, articulating a wide range of popular 
grievances. There is no comparable level of civil society organization in South Sudan, 
and many national advocates for peace and human rights are embedded in foreign donor 
patronage networks that limit their potential for political mobilization of this kind, or are 
aligned with western lobby organizations such as the Enough! Project, which are very 
uncomfortable with taking any robustly critical stand against a government that they 
worked so hard to bring to power. But the potential for explosive change should not be 
underestimated. Just a fortnight before the outbreak of violence, Jok noted the explosive 
potential of popular discontent, especially among the youth, and the way in which the 
country’s leadership, ‘benefiting from the history of South Sudanese popular and blind 
support for the SPLM,’ appeared oblivious to what happens when people ‘become so 
poor, desperate, unable to speak, insecure and above all when they lose trust in their 
leadership? Such is the stuff with which civil unrests, protests, and even outright 
revolutions are made. The political leadership of South Sudan should not play with 
fire.’75 
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